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THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S REDUNDANT 
REMAND IN E.M. v. PAJARO UNIFIED  
VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT SENDS  
AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE 
Edward Dunn* 
Abstract: On July 14, 2011, in E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley School District, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded a case because 
the district court applied an improper standard in determining whether a 
clinical psychologist’s report constituted “additional evidence” under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit 
broadly defined the “additional evidence” courts must consider in hearing 
IDEA claims. 
Introduction 
 In the summer before his fifth grade year, E.M. was diagnosed with 
a learning disability.1 E.M.’s parents requested that the Pajaro Valley 
Unified School District (“School District”) assess his eligibility for spe-
cial education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA).2 The School District assessed E.M. but denied him special 
education services because, according to the School District’s assess-
ment, he did not have a learning disability that warranted such ser-
vices.3 E.M. challenged this decision before the California Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH), but the presiding administrative law 
judge (ALJ) affirmed the School District’s decision.4 E.M. then ap-
pealed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California where he moved to supplement the record with another set 
of tests that he took after the OAH hearing.5 These tests supported the 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2011–2012). 
1 E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (E.M. III ), 652 F.3d 999, 1001–02 
(9th Cir. 2011). E.M.’s parents hired Dr. Roslyn Wright, a psychologist, to evaluate him. Id. 
at 1001. 
2 Id. at 1002. 
3 See id. 
4 See E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (E.M. I ), No. C 06-4694 JF, 
2008 WL 4615436, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2008). 
5 See E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1002. 
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conclusion that E.M. had a learning disability.6 The district court de-
nied E.M.’s motion, deeming the evidence unnecessary, but ultimately 
remanded the case to the ALJ for a more detailed finding.7 The ALJ 
issued a revised opinion elaborating its decision in favor of the School 
District, and the district court granted the School District’s motion for 
summary judgment.8 
 E.M. appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in finding that he failed to 
show a learning disability and that the School District “cherry picked” 
among his available test scores to reach its conclusion.9 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the district court applied an improper standard in deny-
ing E.M.’s motion to supplement the record with additional test scores 
from 2007.10 Although one test used in 2007 did not exist in 2004 when 
the School District initially assessed E.M., the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the district court should nonetheless have considered the 2007 
scores because they may have provided valuable information about 
E.M.’s condition in 2004.11 In his dissent, Judge Bea observed that the 
Ninth Circuit’s remand was redundant because the district court had 
already considered the relevancy of the evidence when the court ex-
cluded it.12 Despite Judge Bea’s criticism, the Ninth Circuit’s redundant 
remand establishes an important precedent for special-education law 
because it broadly defines the “additional evidence” courts must con-
sider in hearing IDEA claims.13 
I. E.M.’s Diagnostic History and Initial Court Proceedings 
 E.M. first enrolled in the School District’s regular education pro-
gram in kindergarten.14 After kindergarten, however, the school desig-
nated him “as being at risk of retention” and required him to attend 
summer school to improve his reading.15 E.M.’s third grade teacher also 
                                                                                                                      
6 See id. 
7 See E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1009 (Bea, J., dissenting); E.M. I, 2008 WL 4615436, at *3. 
8 See E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (E.M. II ), No. C 06-4694 JF, 
2009 WL 2766704, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2009). 
9 See E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1001, 1003 (internal quotations omitted). 
10 Id. at 1005–06. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. at 1009–10 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
13 See id. at 1005–06 (majority opinion). 
14 See E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (E.M. II ), No. C 06-4694 JF, 
2009 WL 2766704, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2009). E.M. was a bilingual student and his 
mother indicated to the School District that Spanish was his first language. Id. at *1 n.3. 
15 Id. at *1. 
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designated him as at risk, but later dropped the designation and instead 
described him as capable and intelligent but “easily distracted.”16 E.M. 
continued to exhibit similar difficulties in the fourth grade but, despite 
these persistent issues, E.M.’s teachers did not consider him a candidate 
for special education.17 
 The summer before his fifth grade year, E.M.’s parents hired Dr. 
Roslyn Wright to evaluate him for a learning disability.18 During her 
evaluation, Dr. Wright administered two disability assessments: the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Third Edition (WISC-III), 
which measures innate cognitive ability; and the Woodcock-Johnson 
Tests of Achievement-III (WJ-III), which measures the capability to assess 
and process information.19 E.M.’s test results displayed a discrepancy 
between his cognitive ability and his actual achievement, revealing a 
“‘[m]ild’ impairment . . . in the areas of listening comprehension and 
oral language.”20 Dr. Wright therefore diagnosed E.M. with a learning 
disability.21 
 Upon receiving Dr. Wright’s report, E.M.’s mother requested that 
the School District assess his eligibility for special education.22 Leslie 
Viall, the School District’s psychologist, assessed E.M. based on tests 
similar to those administered by Dr. Wright, with one notable excep-
tion—she used the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children (K-ABC) 
instead of the WISC-III to measure cognitive ability.23 The School Dis-
trict did not dispute that using E.M.’s K-ABC score would have shown a 
“severe discrepancy” between his intellectual ability and his achieve-
ment score.24 This severe discrepancy may have made E.M. eligible for 
special education services, but Ms. Viall decided not to use the K-ABC 
score.25 Ms. Viall instead decided that the WISC-III score was the most 
                                                                                                                      
 
16 See id. (internal quotations omitted). 
17 See id. 
18 Id. at *2. E.M.’s parents hired Dr. Wright at the suggestion of their immigration at-
torney because a finding of a learning disability could assist in the family’s immigration 
status. Id. at *2 n.5. If Dr. Wright’s report were to show, for example, that a move to Mexico 
would affect E.M.’s development adversely because of his disability, it might affect E.M.’s 
ability to stay in the country. See id. at *2, *2 n.5. 
19 E.M. II, 2009 WL 2766704, at *2. 
20 See id. 
21 Id. 
22 See id. at *3. 
23 See id. 
24 E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (E.M. III ), 652 F.3d 999, 1003 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
25 See id.; E.M. II, 2009 WL 2766704, at *3. The Ninth Circuit identified that Califor-
nia’s codification of IDEA defined a “specific learning disability,” in part, as a “severe dis-
crepancy” between a child’s intellectual ability and achievement “due to a disorder in one 
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reliable, that E.M. did not show a severe discrepancy that warranted 
special education services, and that he would continue to improve 
through general classroom intervention.26  
 E.M.’s parents requested that the School District perform a second 
assessment.27 Dr. Wright also wrote a letter to the School District ex-
plaining that if Ms. Viall had used the K-ABC score instead of the WISC-
III score, she would have found a severe discrepancy likely warranting 
special education services.28 The School District did not dispute Dr. 
Wright’s assertion and agreed to administer another series of tests later 
that year.29 After these tests, the School District again concluded that 
E.M. did not qualify for special education services.30 
 E.M. showed some significant academic progress the following 
year, but he continued to have trouble completing his homework.31 
E.M.’s parents hired an audiologist, Dr. Ruth Kaspar, to evaluate him.32 
Dr. Kaspar concluded that E.M. suffered from an auditory processing 
disorder and a “probable learning disability.”33 E.M.’s parents pre-
sented these findings to the School District, and the School District 
hired its own audiologist, Dr. Jody Winzelberg, to review the report.34 
Dr. Winzelberg disagreed with Dr. Kaspar’s opinion and concluded that 
E.M.’s test results exhibited “some weaknesses in the auditory system,” 
but that he did not suffer from any disorder.35 
 On December 5, 2005, E.M. filed a complaint with the Special Ed-
ucation Division of the OAH, challenging the School District’s denial of 
special education services.36 After a six-day due process hearing, the 
ALJ issued a decision in favor of the School District on every issue.37 
                                                                                                                      
or more of the basic psychological processes . . . .” See E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1003 (citing 
Cal. Educ. Code § 56337 (West 2008)). 
26 See E.M. II, 2009 WL 2766704, at *3–4. Ms. Viall realized that there was a discrepancy 
between E.M.’s K-ABC and WISC-III scores, so she conducted a third test. Id. at *12. The 
third test corroborated the WISC-III score, and therefore Ms. Viall concluded that the 
WISC-III score was the more accurate assessment of E.M.’s cognitive ability. Id. 
27 Id. at *4. 
28 Id. 
29 See E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1003; E.M. II, 2009 WL 2766704, at *5. 
30 E.M. II, 2009 WL 2766704, at *4–5. 
31 See id. at *5. 
32 Id. at *6. 
33 Id. (internal quotations omitted). Dr. Kaspar qualified her diagnosis as “probable” 
because, as an audiologist, she was not properly trained to diagnose learning disabilities. 
See id. 
34 Id. 
35 See E.M. II, 2009 WL 2766704, at *6. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
2012 IDEA’s “Additional Evidence” Mandate 15 
E.M. appealed the ALJ’s decision to the district court pursuant to IDEA, 
which allows parents to challenge an administrative agency’s findings in 
federal court.38 E.M. argued that the School District and the ALJ im-
properly ignored probative evidence because neither had considered 
his K-ABC score, and that the disparity between his K-ABC and WJ-III 
scores corroborated Dr. Kaspar’s finding that he had an auditory proc-
essing disorder.39  
 In addition to challenging the School District’s and the ALJ’s deci-
sions not to consider his K-ABC score, E.M. moved to supplement the 
record with new evidence—a 2007 report from Dr. Cheryl Jacques.40 
Dr. Jacques is a clinical psychologist who administered new tests for 
E.M., including the WISC-IV, a newer version of the WISC-III.41 Based 
on these tests and her review of E.M.’s records, Dr. Jacques diagnosed 
E.M. with a “specific learning disability,” as defined by IDEA.42 There-
fore, although E.M. took these tests after the OAH hearing under re-
view in the district court, he moved to add them to the record because 
the new tests corroborated Dr. Kaspar’s original diagnosis.43  
                                                                                                                     
 The district court denied E.M.’s motion, stating that Dr. Jacques’s 
2007 report was “not necessary to evaluate the ALJ’s determination 
. . . .”44 The district court nonetheless agreed with E.M. that the ALJ did 
not adequately articulate how he reached his conclusion and remanded 
the case for revision.45 On remand, the ALJ explained that he found in 
favor of the School District because Ms. Viall persuasively testified that 
 
38 See E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (E.M. I ), No. C 06-4694 JF, 
2008 WL 4615436, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2008) (citing Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)(2006)). In considering its role in reviewing 
an administrative decision, the district court differentiated IDEA cases from other adminis-
trative appeals in the Ninth Circuit that are typically held to a “highly deferential standard 
of review.” See id. (internal quotations omitted). In contrast, the standard in IDEA cases 
allows for the district court to make its own factual findings while giving appropriate def-
erence to the administrative agency’s findings where they are carefully considered and 
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. 
39 See E.M. II, 2009 WL 2766704, at *6, *11. 
40 E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1002. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. IDEA defines a “specific learning disability” as “a disorder in 1 or more of the ba-
sic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or 
written, which disorder may manifest itself in the imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, 
read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(A). Dr. Jacques 
further noted that it was “puzzling” that the School District did not find E.M. eligible for 
special education in 2004. E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1002 (internal quotations omitted). 
43 See id. at 1002–03, 1006. 
44 See id. at 1009 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
45 See E.M. I, 2008 WL 4615436, at *3. 
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using E.M.’s WISC-III score was the best measure of his cognitive abil-
ity.46 Ms. Viall testified that she realized there was a discrepancy be-
tween E.M.’s K-ABC and WISC-III scores, so she conducted a third 
test.47 The third test corroborated the WISC-III score, and therefore 
Ms. Viall concluded that the WISC-III score was the more accurate as-
sessment of E.M.’s cognitive ability.48  
 The district court ultimately held that the ALJ’s reasoning was ad-
equately supported and that his judgment concerning witness credibil-
ity was entitled to deference.49 The court further noted that school sys-
tems maintain the right to use their discretion in selecting which diag-
nostic tests will determine special education eligibility, and that the 
School District’s choice to use the WISC-III score was not unreason-
able.50 The district court granted the School District’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, concluding that E.M. failed to establish that he suf-
fered from a learning disability.51 E.M. appealed, and the Ninth Circuit 
partially reversed and remanded the case to the district court.52 The 
Ninth Circuit remanded because “the district court applied an incor-
rect standard for admission of after-acquired evidence” when it ex-
cluded Dr. Jacques’s 2007 report.53 On remand, the Ninth Circuit in-
                                                                                                                      
46 See E.M. II, 2009 WL 2766704, at *12–13. The ALJ found Ms. Viall’s testimony more 
persuasive because of her experience in applying special education concepts in her work, 
whereas Dr. Wright admitted that she was unfamiliar with many basic special education 
concepts. Id. at *12. Ms. Viall testified that she administered the K-ABC test during her 
own evaluation, despite her opinion that the WISC-III test was a better measure of cogni-
tive ability, because Dr. Wright had recently administered the WISC-III to E.M. Id. 
47 See id. The third test Ms. Viall conducted was the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence-3 
(TONI), which also measures cognitive ability. Id. at *3, *12. 
48 See id. at *12. Ms. Viall testified that E.M.’s WISC-III score (104) and his TONI score 
(98) were more consistent with each other than his K-ABC score (111). See id. 
49 See id. at *13. 
50 See id. (citing Ford ex rel. Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 1086, 1088–
89 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Ford court held that a school district’s assessment of a student for 
special education services met the legal standard when it applied standardized tests instead 
of a traditional IQ test to measure cognitive ability. See 291 F.3d at 1088–89. The district 
court rejected E.M.’s argument that the School District failed to properly assess him in all 
related areas to his potential disability, noting that the School District performed at least 
one auditory processing test during its evaluation. See E.M. II, 2009 WL 2766704, at *16. 
The district court agreed with the School District’s assertion that it administered an audi-
tory processing test when it conducted a test which “arguably addresses auditory processing 
through a subtest involving sentence repetition.” Id. (emphasis added). 
51 See E.M. II, 2009 WL 2766704, at *17. 
52 E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1006. 
53 Id. 
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structed the district court to reconsider whether the School District 
complied with IDEA in light of Dr. Jacques’s report.54 
II. The Ninth Circuit’s Redundant Remand 
 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the critical question was wheth-
er the School District met its obligation to properly assess E.M.’s eligi-
bility for special education services.55 The court scrutinized E.M.’s as-
sessments but ultimately remanded this critical question back to the 
district court.56 In so doing, however, the Ninth Circuit broadly defined 
IDEA’s mandate that courts “shall hear additional evidence at the re-
quest of a party . . . .”57  
 The Ninth Circuit began its inquiry into whether the School Dis-
trict met its obligation to properly assess E.M. by scrutinizing E.M.’s as-
sessments.58 The court stated that despite the district court’s finding 
that the School District administered at least one auditory processing 
test, the only formal auditory assessment came from Dr. Kaspar’s evalua-
tion which resulted in a diagnosis of a disorder.59 Although the School 
District had hired its own audiologist to review Dr. Kaspar’s diagnosis, 
the court indicated that this did not adequately support the School Dis-
trict’s finding that E.M. did not suffer from a “disorder in a basic psycho-
logical process.”60 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the district 
court improperly concluded that E.M. failed to establish that he suf-
fered from such a disorder.61  
                                                                                                                     
 Regarding the “severe discrepancy” between E.M.’s cognitive abil-
ity and achievement scores, the court considered whether IDEA would 
allow the School District “to exclude the valid results of a test the dis-
trict itself selected and administered[.]”62 The court recognized that 
school systems have discretion in selecting diagnostic tests to determine 
special education eligibility, and that “[t]his question touches on a fun-
damental tension in special education law—that between ensuring that 
 
54 Id. 
55 See E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (E.M. III ), 652 F.3d 999, 1007 
(9th Cir. 2011). 
56 See id. at 1003–04, 1006–07. 
57 See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 
1415(i)(2)(C)(ii) (2006); E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1005. 
58 E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1003–04. 
59 See id.; E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (E.M. II ), No. C 06-4694 JF, 
2009 WL 2766704, at *16 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
60 See E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1003 (internal quotations omitted). 
61 See id. 
62 See id. at 1004. 
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all disabled children have access to educational opportunity and ensur-
ing that non-disabled children are not improperly identified as dis-
abled.”63 School systems have a duty to take the appropriate measures 
to ensure that children with disabilities have access to a “successful 
educational experience” while simultaneously ensuring that children 
without disabilities are not improperly diagnosed.64 
 In support of this duty, IDEA mandated that “no single procedure 
shall be the sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational 
program for a child.”65 California’s codification of IDEA adhered to 
this mandate by instructing school systems to consider “all relevant ma-
terial which is available on the pupil” in determining the existence of a 
“specific learning disability.”66 In accordance with this language, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a school district must make a “reasonable 
choice” when confronted with conflicting test results.67 Therefore, 
whether IDEA allows a school district to exclude valid test results from a 
test the district itself selected and administered depends on whether 
the exclusion was a “reasonable choice.”68 
 The Ninth Circuit refrained from expressly declaring the School 
District’s exclusion of E.M.’s K-ABC score unreasonable, and instead 
focused on the district court’s exclusion of Dr. Jacques’s 2007 report as a 
misapplication of the standard required by IDEA.69 IDEA allows district 
courts to make their own factual findings in reviewing administrative 
holdings, but mandates that courts “shall hear additional evidence at 
the request of a party . . . .”70 IDEA does not provide a functional defini-
tion for “additional evidence,” but the Ninth Circuit explained that 
“under [its] precedent, evidence that is non-cumulative, relevant, and 
                                                                                                                      
63 Id. “This tension is particularly salient for minority students, who historically have 
been over-identified as disabled and disproportionally placed in segregated educational 
settings, due in part to biased IQ tests.” Id. IDEA stresses the importance of addressing this 
tension by calling for greater efforts “to prevent the intensification of problems connected 
with mislabeling and high dropout rates among minority children with disabilities.” See 20 
U.S.C. § 1400(c)(12)(A). 
64 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c)(2)(C), (c)(12)(A); see also E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1004 (recog-
nizing that these duties are in tension); Larry P. ex rel. Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 983 
(9th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging the discriminatory removal of black children from regular 
education classes). 
65 See E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1004 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(6)(B)) (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
66 Id. (quoting Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j) (2011)) (internal quotations omit-
ted). 
67 Id. 
68 See id. at 1004–06. 
69 See id. 
70 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), (i)(2)(C)(ii); see E.M. II, 2009 WL 2766704, at *7. 
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otherwise admissible constitutes ‘additional evidence’ . . . .”71 The Ninth 
Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong standard in ex-
cluding Dr. Jacques’s 2007 report.72 Instead of determining that the re-
port was not necessary to evaluate the ALJ’s finding, the district court 
should have considered whether the report constituted “relevant, non-
cumulative, and otherwise admissible” evidence.73 The Ninth Circuit 
explained that while evidence accrued in hindsight should not be used 
exclusively, subsequent events “may provide significant insight into the 
child’s condition, and the reasonableness of the school district’s action, 
at the earlier date.”74 The Ninth Circuit remanded the issue, instructing 
the district court to evaluate the relevance of the 2007 report in the con-
text of the School District’s actions in 2004 using the correct standard.75  
 In his dissent, Judge Bea criticized this remand because Dr. 
Jacques’s 2007 report could not have had any bearing on the School 
District’s decision in 2004.76 The test Dr. Jacques administered in 2007, 
the WISC-IV, did not exist in 2004 and therefore could not have been 
relevant to the School District’s determination at that time.77 As a re-
sult, Dr. Jacques’s report was not evidence that could inform the court’s 
assessment of the reasonableness of the School District’s exclusion of 
E.M.’s K-ABC score.78 Furthermore, the district court had already con-
sidered the evidence when it concluded that the report was unneces-
sary.79 Remanding to reconsider its relevance would be “wasting time 
and resources” just “so that the district court [could] again make a de-
termination it [had] already made.”80 The Ninth Circuit nevertheless 
remanded E.M.’s case to determine whether the School District met its 
obligation to test E.M. for an auditory processing disorder, and whether 
                                                                                                                      
71 E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1005; see 20 U.S.C. § 1401. The Ninth Circuit referred to two 
cases as “our precedent.” See E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1004–05; Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141 
(9th Cir. 1999); Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1993). In Ojai, the 
district court admitted evidence of an event that occurred subsequent to the administra-
tive hearing, and the Ninth Circuit ruled that this was a proper admission of “additional 
evidence.” See 4 F.3d at 1473. In Adams, the Ninth Circuit held that intervention measures 
implemented subsequent to the event in question “may shed light on the adequacy of” the 
school district’s actions during the relevant time period. See 195 F.3d at 1149. 
72 E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1006. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See id. 
76 Id. at 1007–08 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
77 See E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1008 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
78 See id. at 1009. 
79 See id. 
80 Id. at 1009–10. 
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Dr. Jacques’s 2007 report was relevant to the reasonableness of the 
School District’s actions in 2004.81 
III. The Importance of the Ninth Circuit’s Remand 
 Judge Bea’s dissent logically questioned the purpose of ordering a 
district court to consider evidence it has already considered.82 By deny-
ing its admission, the district court determined that the report was ir-
relevant to the reasonableness of the School District’s 2004 decision to 
exclude E.M.’s K-ABC score.83 The district court’s finding that the 2007 
report was irrelevant meant that it did not constitute “additional evi-
dence” under the Ninth Circuit’s definition because “additional evi-
dence” must be non-cumulative, otherwise admissible, and relevant.84 
Therefore, according to Judge Bea, the majority’s remand was redun-
dant.85 
 The disagreement about whether the district court erred in this 
case highlights the concern that school systems will be judged exclu-
sively in hindsight.86 Embedded in this concern is the possibility that a 
party might undercut the expertise of an administrative agency by saving 
its best evidence for the district court proceeding.87 Hindsight could 
play a greater role in the execution of justice than perhaps it should 
when “additional evidence” is admitted that the administrative agency 
did not have an opportunity to hear.88 
 Yet the purpose of IDEA’s “additional evidence” mandate is to cre-
ate a safeguard for parents of children with disabilities who disagree 
with an administrative agency’s findings.89 Although this safeguard was 
not intended to transform the nature of a district court hearing from 
one of review to one of de novo, IDEA’s “additional evidence” mandate 
                                                                                                                      
81 See id. at 1006–07 (majority opinion). 
82 See E.M. ex rel. E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (E.M. III ), 652 F.3d 999, 1009–
10 (9th Cir. 2011) (Bea, J., dissenting). 
83 See id. at 1009. 
84 See id. at 1005 (majority opinion); id. at 1009 & n.3 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
85 See id. at 1009–10 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
86 See id. at 1006 (majority opinion) (citing Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th 
Cir. 1999)). Adams held that a school system’s actions cannot be judged exclusively in 
hindsight because a disability assessment is a “snapshot” of a child’s condition at the time it 
is administered, and thus any judgment as to the reasonableness of a school system’s ac-
tions must take this into account. See 195 F.3d at 1149–50 (internal quotations omitted). 
87 See Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Town 
of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 791 (1st Cir. 1984)). 
88 See E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1006; Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1473 (citing Burlington, 736 F.2d at 791). 
89 See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C § 1415(a), 
(i)(2)(A), (i)(2)(C)(ii)(2006); Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1471–72; Burlington, 736 F.2d at 791, 793. 
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safeguards children with disabilities by allowing district courts the lati-
tude, indeed the responsibility, to form judgments that are not com-
pletely bound by the administrative record.90 Evidence that could fur-
ther inform the court on a child’s condition must be carefully consid-
ered because the possibility of incorrectly ruling on a child’s educa-
tional future is IDEA’s paramount concern.91 Congress enacted IDEA 
because it found that the needs of children with disabilities were not 
being adequately met.92 IDEA embodies “an essential element of our 
national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with 
disabilities.”93 Thus, IDEA’s express purpose is to ensure that every 
child with a disability has equal access to education.94 The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s broad definition of “additional evidence” supports that purpose.95 
 In E.M.’s case, the district court did not consider the evidence as 
IDEA intended when the court determined that Dr. Jacques’s 2007 re-
port was unnecessary to assess the reasonableness of the School Dis-
trict’s previous actions.96 Instead of considering whether the report was 
necessary, the district court should have considered whether the report, 
when viewed in conjunction with the administrative record, could have 
helped inform a more complete finding.97 The Ninth Circuit refrained 
from ruling that Dr. Jacques’s report was “additional evidence” that 
should be admitted pursuant to IDEA, but instead remanded that de-
termination to the district court.98 While Judge Bea may have correctly 
predicted that on remand the district court will again find that Dr. 
Jacques’s report is irrelevant, the Ninth Circuit established important 
precedent by broadly defining the “additional evidence” courts must 
hear in IDEA claims.99 
                                                                                                                      
90 See 20 U.S.C § 1415(a), (i)(2)(A), (i)(2)(C)(ii); Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1471–73; Burlington, 
736 F.2d at 791, 793. In Burlington, the First Circuit held that the district court must resolve 
discrepancies in the record and “must make a finding as to the nature of the child’s learn-
ing disabilities . . . .” See 736 F.2d at 793, 802. 
91 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1004, 1006. 
92 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2). Congress found that this inadequacy resulted in the ex-
clusion of disabled children from the public school system and prevented them from hav-
ing a “successful educational experience.” See id. 
93 See id. § 1400(c)(1). 
94 See id.; E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1004–06. 
95 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1); E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1004–06. 
96 See E.M. III, 652 F.3d at 1005–06. 
97 See id. at 1006. 
98 See id. at 1004–07. 
99 See id. (majority opinion); id. at 1009–10 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
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Conclusion 
 The Ninth Circuit effectively determined that the district court 
failed to adhere to IDEA’s “additional evidence” mandate when the dis-
trict court deemed Dr. Jacques’s 2007 report unnecessary. The district 
court should have considered whether the report was “non-cumulative, 
relevant and otherwise admissible” evidence. The difference between 
an inquiry of necessity and one of “additional evidence” may seem 
technical, but it is far from trivial. IDEA’s “additional evidence” man-
date exists because Congress decided that it was important to give par-
ents of children with disabilities an opportunity to challenge an adverse 
administrative ruling to an alternative forum. Without the ability to 
supplement the record, the appellate process would be limited to a re-
view of the administrative record and courts would have less latitude in 
ensuring schools comply with Congress’s mandates. IDEA’s purpose is 
to ensure that children with disabilities have an equal opportunity to 
succeed in the classroom, and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in E.M. ex rel. 
E.M. v. Pajaro Unified Valley School District supports that purpose. 
